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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD 
OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that Mrs. 
Boyer was not awarded an equitable interest with Mr. Boyer in the commercial building on 
25 Street in Ogden, Utah, where Mr. Boyer conducts his business. 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant 
to this appeal issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or 
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this 
appeal issue: Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 176 P.3d 476 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jensen v. 
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); 
Mortensen v. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304 (Utah 1998); Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990); Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. Jensen 
v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117, 120 (Utah Ct. App. 2008). 
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Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in not awarding Mrs. 
Boyer any share of Mr. Boyer's retirement accounts. 
Determinative Law: There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be 
wholly dispositive or determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases 
are relevant to this appeal issue: Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431 (Utah 1982); Riley v. 
Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. Riley v. 
Riley, 138 P.3d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716, 720 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2003). 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ordering that the 
alimony awarded to Mrs. Boyer, from Mr. Boyer, be structured to be reduced over a certain 
period of time. 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant 
to this appeal issue. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or 
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this 
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 
84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v. 
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. 
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008). 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
Issue 4: Whether the District Court made an error in regard to Mrs. Boyer's 
actual alimony award and whether it is erroneous the Court order states that alimony 
commences July 1, 2008, for at least two, five year periods, and then for another period of 
time after. 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant 
to this appeal issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or 
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determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this 
appeal issue: Allred v. Alfred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); Richardson v. 
Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); 
Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v. Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. 
App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is clearly erroneous. Allred v. 
Allred, 835 P.2d 974, 979 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
Issue 5: Whether the District Court abused its discretion and did not address the 
issue of fault on the alimony award where Mr. Boyer passed a social/venereal disease to Mrs. 
Boyer during the parties marriage as a result of Mr. Boyer's infidelity. 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant 
to this appeal issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or 
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this 
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 
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84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v. 
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. 
Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008). 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
Issue 6: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in its alimony award by 
not considering the Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal 
disease from Mr. Boyer. 
Determinative Law: There is no constitutional provision, statute, ordinance, rule or 
regulation whose interpretation is wholly determinative. Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is relevant 
to this appeal issue. 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 is lengthy and attached as part of the addendum. 
There is no case law authority believed by Appellant to be wholly dispositive or 
determinative of this issue presented on appeal, but the following cases are relevant to this 
appeal issue: Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942 (Utah 2008); Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 
84 (Utah Ct. App. 2006); Davis v. Davis, 76 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2003); Jensen v. 
Jensen, 197 P.3d 117 (Utah Ct. App. 2008); Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985). 
Standard of Review: The standard of appellate review is abuse of discretion. 
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Richardson v. Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008). 
Preserved in the Trial Court: This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice 
of Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE: This appeal is from a final order of the Second 
Judicial District Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, specifically an appeal from 
the following: 
a. Amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009, 
signed on March 25, 2010, entered on or about March 26, 2010. 
b. Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc to June 1,2009, signed on March 25, 
2010, entered on or about March 26, 2010. 
B. COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND THE DISPOSITION BELOW: 
The trial court awarded the entire interest Mr. Boyer had in the commercial building 
on 25th Street to Mr. Boyer, without equitable distribution, as his separate property. The trial 
court did award alimony to Mrs. Boyer, set up in a tiered structure. Each party was awarded 
their own retirement account. 
Mrs. Boyer, through this appeal, is seeking to have an equitable distribution or set-off 
of the property above, is seeking an equitable distribution or "Woodward" share of Mr. 
Boyer's retirement account, and is seeking to adjust and clarify the alimony award. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Mr. and Mrs. Boyer married on July 10, 1993. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc 
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2) 
2. Three children have been born as issue to the marriage. {Amended Decree of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2) 
3. Mrs. Boyer filed for Divorce against Mr. Boyer in March of 2007. {Amended 
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 2) 
4. Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (Trial 
Transcript, hereinafter: "TT" at pg. 487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. 1, pg. 23,11. 17-22.) 
5. Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that during the marriage she had 
contracted a sexual transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11. 
5-17.) 
6. Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that as a result of the sexually 
transmitted disease she received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer had to have surgery, where she 
had part of her cervix removed and then she had a cone biopsy because she had carcinoma 
insi2, and as a further result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to have a complete and total 
hysterectomy, where she had her uterus and an ovary removed. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-17) 
7. The parties were awarded joint custody of their children. {Amended Decree of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 2) 
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8. During the marriage, Mrs. Boyer worked part time, earning approximately $11.50 
an hour, where Mr. Boyer was employed as a stock broker and financial advisor. {Amended 
Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 4, 5) 
9. The Court found Mrs. Boyer was thirty-eight (38) years old and employed as a 
bookkeeper for her father-in-law, and found it appropriate to impute her to full-time status 
with her hourly rate of $ 11.50 an hour. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 
I 2009, pg. 4-5) 
10. The Court found Mrs. Boyer's salary, imputing a full-time wage, to be $1,993.00 
per month, less $399.00 of mandatory deductions, to find Mrs. Boyer's net income to be 
approximately $ 1,594.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 
1, 2009, pg. 5) 
11. The Court found that Mrs. Boyer would receive child support of $677.00 per 
month, giving Mrs. Boyer a net monthly income of $2,271.00. {Amended Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 5) 
12. Mr. Boyer's income was disputed during trial. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc 
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 5, 6) 
13. The Court did find that Mr. Boyer was earning approximately $160,000 per year, 
from 1994-2003. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 5) 
14. The Court found that Mr. Boyer's discretionary cash flow for his business and for 
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the purpose of establishing alimony and child support, is approximately $110,000 per year. 
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 7) 
15. The Court found that after anticipated taxes, Mr. Boyer would have a net income 
of approximately $6,600.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To 
June 1, 2009, pg. 7) 
16. The Court found Mrs. Boyer's reasonable monthly expenses of approximately 
$4,967.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June I, 2009, pg. 7) 
17. The Court found that including Mrs. Boyer's imputed net income of $ 1,594.00 per 
month and including child support from Mr. Boyer at $677.00 per month, Mrs. Boyer's net 
income is $2,271.00 per month, which leaves Mrs. Boyer a $2,696.00 short-fall each month. 
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 7) 
18. The Court found that Mr. Boyer's reasonable monthly expense for himself and the 
children is approximately $5,762.00 per month, where adding his child support obligation of 
$677.00 per month, Mr. Boyer has reasonable monthly expenses of $6,439.00 per month and 
leaves him with $217.00 per month. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 
2009, pg.7) 
19. The Court found that to equalize the parties' standard of living, that Mr. Boyer is 
ordered to pay Mrs. Boyer $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, 
commencing July 1,2008. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 
13 
8) 
20. The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 per month on July 
1,2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until 
December 31,2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. {Amended Decree of Divorce 
Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
21. During the parties' marriage, Mr. Boyer had acquired a partnership interest in a 
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. 
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
22. The Court found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities, 
to have a net value of approximately $20,300.00, where Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share 
of the building. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
23. The Court awarded each party their own retirement account without detailed 
findings. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9) 
24. Mr. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs. 
Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $2,500. {Amended Decree of 
Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 9) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Mr. and Mrs. Boyer married on July 10, 1993, where Mrs. Boyer filed for divorce 
against Mr. Boyer in March of 2007, approximately just under fourteen (14) years of 
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marriage. 
During the marriage, Mr. Boyer was employed (and self employed) as a financial 
planner, and had acquired a partnership interest in a commercial building, located at 204 25 
Street, Ogden, Utah. Mr. Boyer conducts his business at this building on 25th Street. The 
Court found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities, to have a net 
value of approximately $20,300.00. Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share of the building. 
Mrs. Boyer is entitled to one-half of the value of the building. 
During the marriage, both Mr. Boyer and Mrs. Boyer had accumulated a retirement 
account. At the time trial, Mr. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately 
$12,500, where Mrs. Boyer's retirement account was valued at approximately $2,500. The 
Court found that each party retain their own retirement account. Mrs. Boyer is entitled to a 
"Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's retirement account. 
During the course of the parties' marriage, Mr. Boyer was unfaithful, and committed 
adultery by having sexual relations with a woman who was not Mrs. Boyer. As a result of 
Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness, he impregnated another woman, and a child has been born. 
Further, Mr. Boyer's unfaithfulness actions caused Mrs. Boyer to receive a sexually 
transmitted disease. Although Mrs. Boyer did receive an alimony award, it appears the Court 
did not consider the fault of Mr. Boyer for his adulterous actions, and it further appears the 
Court did not take into consideration when factoring its alimony award the health problems 
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and concerns that Mrs. Boyer now must suffer with. Regarding the alimony award to Mrs. 
Boyer, the Court should take into consideration the fault of Mr. Boyer for his unfaithfulness 
and the Court should further take into consideration the health concerns and problems that 
Mrs. Boyer had suffered from and will suffer from because of Mr. Boyer's act of committing 
adultery. 
Further, in regard to the alimony award, the Court did not include any findings or 
reasoning for reducing the alimony award over a certain period of time. The reduction in the 
alimony award is significant, nearly being cut in half. The Court should not reduce the 
alimony award over time, especially where there is no reason for the reduction. 
Finally, an error has been made in the length and amount of the alimony award. The 
Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428.00 each month for a period of 
five years, commencing on July 1, 2008. The Court then reduced the alimony award to 
$1,000.00 per month to take effect on July 1, 2013 for a period of five years. Further, the 
Court then awarded a further reduced amount of alimony to $800.00 per month until 
December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony is then to terminate. Two errors exist here. 
The first error that exists here is that it was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive 
alimony at a $ 1,000.00 for five years beginning July 1,2013, hence the five year time period 
at the $1,000 rate would cease July 1, 2018. The obvious problem here is that there are 
conflicting awards. On one hand, the alimony at $800 per month is to cease December 31, 
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2015; however, alimony at $1,000 is to cease July, 2018 (plus it is continue at an amount of 
$800). It is clear the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to receive alimony for ten (10) years at 
different amounts, and then for her to receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a 
month. If Mrs. Boyer does not receive a permanent award of alimony, the award then should 
at least be for the duration of the length of the parties marriage. 
The second error that exists, is that although the Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc 
Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009 states that alimony should be set at $1,428.00, for five years, 
beginning July 1,2008, the actual amount Judge Lyon awarded when reciting the provisions 
of the decree of divorce was that of $1,457.00. At a minimum, the Decree of Divorce should 
contain the figure of $1,457.00 for alimony in lieu of the $1,428.00 figure. 
ARGUMENT 
Issue 1: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in determining that 
Mrs. Boyer was not awarded an equitable interest with Mr. Boyer in the commercial 
building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where Mr. Boyer conducts his business. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal. 
Mr. Boyer works as a financial planner, and during he and Mrs. Boyer's marriage 
relationship, Mr. Boyer acquired a partnership interest in a commercial building located at 
204 25 Street, Ogden, Utah, which is the same location Mr. Boyer operates and conducts his 
business. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court 
found Mr. Boyer's portion of the building, after calculating liabilities, to have a net value of 
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approximately $20,300.00, where Mrs. Boyer was not awarded a share of the building. 
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
Mr. Boyer cannot come up with any legal reasoning as to why the partial interest he 
has in the building located at 204 25 Street in Ogden should not be equitably divided as 
marital property. In Mortensen v. Mortensen, a Utah Supreme Court case, the Court analyzed 
property divisions in divorce matters, and reasoned that such divisions should be "equitable" 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5. Mortensen, 760 P.2d 304, 308 (Utah 1998). 
This type of reasoning was echoed recently by the Stonehocker v. Stonehocker case, 
when Stonehocker quoted the following excerpt from Mortensen: "Any significant disparity 
in the division of the remaining property should be based on an equitable rationale other than 
on the sole fact that one spouse is awarded his or her gifts of inheritance." Stonehocker, 176 
P.3d 476,483 (Utah Ct. App. 2008), quoting Mortensen, 760 P.2d at 308. The Stonehocker 
Court was addressing the issue of the trial court providing an equitable division of marital 
property, which in most instances does not include gifts or inheritances. Id. In fact, the Utah 
Court of Appeals has stated that "[m]arital property is ordinarily all property acquired during 
the marriage and it 'encompasses all of the assets of every nature possessed by the parties, 
whenever obtained and from whatever source derived.'" Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 
1317-1318 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (citations omitted). 
The Dunn case addressed "marital property" and the equitable division aspect of it by 
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holding the following: 
Thus, the corporation was founded and operated through the joint efforts and 
sacrifices of the parties. In addition, because Dr. Dunn chose to work sixty to 
seventy hours per week, he left Mrs. Dunn with the sole responsibility of 
running the household and managing the household accounts. Further, she was 
left without his companionship and domestic contributions during those hours. 
While she was not his partner in the business of orthopedic surgery, she was 
his partner in the "business" of marriage and her efforts were necessary 
contributions to the growth of his practice and the business. As such, she is 
entitled to her fair share in any marital assets derived from their joint efforts in 
that endeavor. 
Id. at 1319 (citations omitted). 
Further, the Utah Court of Appeal admonished trial courts handling divorce matters 
with property disputes the following counsel: "The court should first properly categorize the 
parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the separate property of one or the other. 
Each party is presumed to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of 
the marital property." Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166 at 1172 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Here, Mr. Boyer had a partial interest in the commercial building at 204 25 Street, 
where he conducts his business. The building was not acquired as a gift nor inheritance, but 
rather was acquired on Mr. Boyer's behalf during the marriage and should be considered 
marital property. Although Mrs. Boyer did not work for Mr. Boyer's financial team, the 
building is considered marital property. The Court should divide equally (or provide an 
offset) that of Mr. Boyer's partial interest on the building located on 25 Street with Mrs. 
Boyer. 
19 
Issue 2: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in not awarding Mrs. 
Boyer any share of Mr. Boyer's retirement accounts. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal. 
At the time of the parties' divorce trial, Mr. Boyer was found to have a retirement 
account valued at approximately $12,500, where Mrs. Boyer was found to have a retirement 
account valued at approximately $2,500. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To 
June 1, 2009, pg. 9) Without any detailed findings or analysis, the Court awarded each party 
their own separate retirement account. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 
l,2009,pg.9) 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed the issue of spouses dividing their retirement 
accounts by reasoning the following: 
. . . [Pjension or retirement benefits are a form of deferred compensation by the 
employer. If the rights to those benefits are acquired during the marriage, then 
the court must at least consider those benefits in making an equitable 
distribution of the marital assets. " 'The right to receive monies in the future is 
unquestionably . . . an economic resource' subject to equitable distribution 
based upon proper computation of its present dollar value." 
Woodward v. Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, 432 (Utah 1982) (citations omitted). 
The Utah Court of Appeals recently addressed the equitable division of retirement 
benefits between a divorcing husband and wife by stating the following: 
Although "retirement accounts are part of the marital estate and they are 
generally to be equitably divided,... 'an unequal division of marital property. 
. . is . . . justified when the trial court memorializes in commendably detailed 
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findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution.'" 
Riley v. Riley, 138 P.3d 84, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (citations omitted). 
As demonstrated by the Woodward and Riley Courts, retirement accounts accrued 
during a marriage are to be equitably divided amongst divorcing spouses. See generally, 
Woodward, 656 P.2d 431, see generally, Riley, 138 P.3d 84. If a trial court proceeds with an 
unequal distribution of the retirement account(s), the trial court must memorialize in 
"commendably detailed findings the exceptional circumstances supporting the distribution." 
See Riley, 138P.3dat89. 
Here, the trial Court awarded each party their own retirement account, which varied 
significantly, however the trial court did not provide the detailed findings as its required to as 
dictated in the Woodward and Riley. Mrs. Boyer should be awarded an equitable distribution 
or proper offset of Mr. Boyer's retirement. 
Issue 3: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in ordering that the 
alimony awarded to Mrs. Boyer, from Mr. Boyer, be structured to be reduced over a 
certain period of time. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal. 
The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $ 1,428.00 in alimony each month for 
a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1,2008. {Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 
per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to 
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$800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. 
{Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination 
of alimony . . . an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson v. 
Richardson, 201 P.3d 942, 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court 
further reasoned that when making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several 
factors, including (1) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability 
of the recipient spouse to produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to 
provide support." Id. (citations omitted). 
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary 
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same 
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of 
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
A recent Utah Supreme Court case addressed the issue of prospective changes to 
alimony by stating: "Generally, it is true that, because of the uncertainty of future events, 
prospective changes to alimony are disfavored." Id. at 944 (citations omitted). The 
Richardson Court continued its analysis by providing the following example: "Thus, a plan to 
retire, without actually retiring, would be insufficient to justify a prospective alimony 
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reduction." Id. (citations omitted). 
Here, the trial court awarded alimony in favor of Mrs. Boyer, wherein the award was 
prospectively reduced after set time periods. The Court in this instance should not have 
reduced the monthly dollar alimony award after set time periods, especially where the trial 
court did not provide adequate findings nor reasoning for the reduction. 
Issue 4: Whether the District Court made an error in regard to Mrs. Boyer's 
actual alimony award and whether it is clearly erroneous the Court orders alimony to 
terminate December 31,2015, where the Court's order states that alimony commences 
July 1, 2008, for at least two, five year periods, and then for another period of time 
after. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal. 
The Court ordered Mr. Boyer to pay Mrs. Boyer $ 1,428.00 in alimony each month for 
a period of five (5) years, commencing July 1,2008. (Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro 
Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) The Court further ordered that alimony is reduced to $ 1,000.00 
per month on July 1, 2013, for another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to 
$800.00 per month until December 31, 2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. 
(Amended Decree of Divorce Nunc Pro Tunc To June 1, 2009, pg. 8) 
The Utah Appeals Court follows a standard of review of clearly erroneous when the 
issue is if the award given by the trial court is contrary to its intent. Allredv. Alfred, 835 P.2d 
974, 978 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). The Allred Court continued by noting that it only reverses its 
awards if "we determine that it is not based on substantial evidence or if it is clearly 
23 
erroneous." Id. at 978-979 (citations omitted). 
Part of the trial court order dictated by the trial Court Judge at the conclusion of the 
parties' divorce trial differs than what the actual language is as contained in the order drafted 
by Mr. Boyer's counsel. When Judge Lyon verbally gave his order, he initially stated in 
regard to an alimony award that Mr. Boyer pay Mrs. Boyer an amount of $1,457 per month 
for aperiod of five years, commencing July 1,2008. (TT atpg. 1061,11.18-20). The amount 
of alimony contained in the order at $1,428 should be changed to reflect what the Judge 
actually had dictated. 
Further, the other "error" contained in this issue is the actual duration or termination 
of the alimony award. The Court awarded Mrs. Boyer alimony in the amount of $1,428 
(disputed at $ 1,457) per month for a period of five years, commencing on July 1,2008. The 
Court then awarded alimony for another five years, to commence on July 1, 2013, at $1,000 
per month. The Court then reduced the alimony award even further to $800 per month to 
take place after the alimony award of $ 1,000 has run its course, but the Court also terminates 
the $800 alimony award December 31, 2015. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) addresses alimony in the following way: 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining 
alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
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(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring 
support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by 
the payor spouse; 
and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the 
payor spouse's skill by paying for education received by the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the marriage. 
It was the Court's intention that Mrs. Boyer receive alimony at a $1,000.00 for five 
years beginning July 1,2013, hence the five year time period at the $1,000 rate would cease 
July 1, 2018. It is clear the Court intended Mrs. Boyer to receive alimony for ten (10) years 
at different amounts, and then for her to receive alimony for another time period at $800.00 a 
month. The error here is that alimony cannot terminate on December 31, 2015, and also 
continue to July 2018, and continue even further pas that date with a different amount. If 
Mrs. Boyer does not receive a permanent award of alimony, the award then should at least be 
for the duration of the length of the parties marriage. 
Issue 5: Whether the District Court abused its discretion and did not address the 
issue of fault on the alimony award where Mr. Boyer passed a social/venereal disease to 
Mrs. Boyer during the parties marriage as a result of Mr. Boyer's infidelity. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal 
Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (TT at pg. 
487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. l,pg.23,ll. 17-22.) Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer 
that during the marriage she had contracted a sexual transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer. 
(TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11. 5-17.) Testimony was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer 
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that as a result of the sexually transmitted disease she received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer 
had to have surgery, where she had part of her cervix removed and then she had a cone 
biopsy because she had carcinoma insi2, and as a further result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to 
have a complete and total hysterectomy, where she had her uterus and an ovary removed. 
(TTatpg.497,11. 8-17) 
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination 
of alimony... an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson, 201 P.3d 
at 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court further reasoned that when 
making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several factors, including (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to 
produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary 
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same 
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of 
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
Further, Riley quotes Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) which allows a court to consider 
the fault of the parties in determining an alimony award. Riley 138 P.3d at 88. In Riley the 
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husband committed extra marital affairs, and the court considered "fault" when structuring its 
alimony award. Id. at 88-89. The Riley Court also noted the following in regard to fault: 
"Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful conduct that led 
to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the trial 
court to consider fault." Id. at 88. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) reads: "Alimony may not be ordered for a 
duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of 
alimony for a longer period of time." Based on the previous statute cited in this paragraph, 
and based on the sexual transmitted disease Mr. Boyer passed on to Mrs. Boyer while he was 
still married to her, and also taking into account the problems this has caused the Petitioner, 
Mrs. Boyer should be awarded a permanent alimony award. 
The Court should have, but never made any specific findings or references regarding 
Mr. Boyer's "fault", specifically he committing adultery. The fault aspect should have been 
factored into the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not. 
Issue 6: Whether the District Court abused its discretion in its alimony award by 
not considering Mrs. Boyer's health conditions as a result of obtaining a social/venereal 
disease from Mr. Boyer. 
This issue was preserved in a timely post-trial Notice of Appeal. 
Mr. Boyer was unfaithful during the marriage by committing adultery. (Trial 
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Transcript, hereinafter: "TT" at pg. 487,11.24-25, pg. 489,1. 1, pg. 23,11. 17-22.) Testimony 
was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that during the marriage she had contracted a sexual 
transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-10, pg. 508,11. 5-17.) Testimony 
was provided at trial by Mrs. Boyer that as a result of the sexually transmitted disease she 
received from Mr. Boyer, Mrs. Boyer had to have surgery, where she had part of her cervix 
removed and then she had a cone biopsy because she had carcinoma insi2, and as a further 
result of this, Mrs. Boyer had to have a complete and total hysterectomy, where she had her 
uterus and an ovary removed. (TT at pg. 497,11. 8-17) 
Utah courts follow the premise that, "[w]hen reviewing a [district] court determination 
of alimony... an appellate court reviews [it] for abuse of discretion." Richardson, 201 P.3d 
at 943 (Utah 2008) (citations omitted). The Richardson Court further reasoned that when 
making alimony determinations, "a district court considers several factors, including (1) the 
financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse, (2) the ability of the recipient spouse to 
produce sufficient income, and (3) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support." Id. 
(citations omitted). 
A further analysis of alimony contains that "a district court also considers the primary 
aims of alimony when making an award: (1) to get the parties as close as possible to the same 
standard of living that existed during the marriage; (2) to equalize the standards of living of 
each party, and (3) to prevent the recipient spouse from becoming a public charge." Id. 
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(citations omitted). 
Further, Riley quotes Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(b) which allows a court to consider 
the fault of the parties in determining an alimony award. Riley 138 P.3d at 88. In Riley the 
husband committed extra marital affairs, and the court considered "fault" when structuring its 
alimony award. Id. at 88-89. The Riley Court also noted the following in regard to fault: 
"Husband's engagement in extramarital affairs and his prolonged deceitful conduct that led 
to the divorce, present precisely the type of situation where the legislature intended the trial 
court to consider fault." Id. at 88. 
Further, Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(h) reads: "Alimony may not be ordered for a 
duration longer than the number of years that the marriage existed unless, at any time prior to 
termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the payment of 
alimony for a longer period of time." Based on the previous statute cited in this paragraph, 
and based on the extreme health problems and surgeries that Mrs. Boyer had to endure 
because of Mr. Boyer's actions, Mrs. Boyer should be awarded a permanent alimony award. 
The Court should have, but never made any specific findings or references regarding 
Mr. Boyer's "fault", specifically he committing adultery which caused Mrs. Boyer a myriad 
of health problems. Mrs. Boyer received a sexually transmitted disease from Mr. Boyer 
during the marriage, and further she has suffered and undergone surgeries, all of which only 
occurred because of the "fault" of Mr. Boyer's adulterous affair, pawned on all of the 
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health problems Mrs. Boyer has associated with Mr. Boyer's that have resulted from her 
receiving that sexually transmitted disease. The fault aspect should have been factored into 
the alimony analysis and calculation, but was not. 
CONCLUSION 
Mrs. Boyer seeks an equitable interest or offset of the partial interest that Mr. Boyer 
has on the 25th Street building. (204 25th Street, Ogden, Utah). 
Mrs. Boyer seeks a "Woodward" share of Mr. Boyer's retirement. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks that alimony structure not reduce over time, but rather say at the 
higher amount. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks that the alimony award be changed from $1,428, to $1,457. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks a permanent alimony award, however, at a minimum, she seeks to 
have the Court determine how long her alimony award is for, and should not be smaller than 
the length of the marriage. 
Mrs. Boyer seeks the Court to include "fault" in its alimony determination. 
DATED this 25th day of August, 2010. 
KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC 
Rand G. Lunceford 
Attorney for Appellant/Petitioner 
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Utah Code 
UTAH STATE LEGISLATURE Home | Site Map | Calendar j Code/Constitution | House | Senate | Search 
Titlc/Chapter/Section: Go To 
Utah Code 
Title 30 Husband and Wife 
Chapter 3 Divorce 
Section 5 Disposition of property «- Maintenance and health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts - Court to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and parent-time -- Determination of alimony -
Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
30-3-5. Disposition of property - Maintenance and health care of parties and children — 
Division of debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and parent-time ~~ 
Determination of alimony ~ Nonmeritorious petition for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the 
children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. The court shall include the following in every 
decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and necessary medical and dental 
expenses of the dependent children including responsibility for health insurance out-of-pocket expenses 
such as co-payments, co-insurance, and deductibles; 
(b) (i) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the purchase and 
maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(ii) a designation of which health, hospital, or dental insurance plan is primary and which health, 
hospital, or dental insurance plan is secondary in accordance with the provisions of Section 30-3-5.4 
which will take effect if at any time a dependent child is covered by both parents1 health, hospital, or 
dental insurance plans; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment of joint debts, obligations, or 
liabilities of the parties contracted or incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or obligees, regarding the court's 
division of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recovery Services. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order assigning financial 
responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately cared for, it may 
include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the dependent children, 
necessitated by the employment or training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody 
of the children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, and for distribution of the 
property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary. 
(4) Child support, custody, visitation, and other matters related to children born to the mother and 
father after entry of the decree of divorce may be added to the decree by modification. 
(5) (a) In determining parent-time rights of parents and visitation rights of grandparents and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall Consider the best interest of the child. 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for peace officer enforcement, the court may 
include in an order establishing a parent-time or visitation schedule a provision, among other things, 
authorizing any peace officer to enforce a court-ordered parent-time or visitation schedule entered under 
rage z o n 
his chapter. 
(6) If a petition for modification of child custody or parent-time provisions of a court 
>rder is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
xpended by the prevailing party in that action, if the court determines that the petition was without 
tierit and not asserted or defended against in good faith. 
(7) If a petition alleges noncompliance with a parent-time order by a parent, or a visitation order by a 
,randparent or other member of the immediate family where a visitation or parent-time right has been 
ireviously granted by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including actual 
ttorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because of the other party's failure to 
rovide or exercise court-ordered visitation or parent-time. 
(8) (a) The court shall consider at least the following factors in determining alimony: 
(i) the financial condition and needs of the recipient spouse; 
(ii) the recipient's earning capacity7 or ability to produce income; 
(iii) the ability of the payor spouse to provide support; 
(iv) the length of the marriage; 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of minor children requiring support; 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked in a business owned or operated by the payor spouse; and 
(vii) whether the recipient spouse directly contributed to any increase in the payor spouse's skill by 
aying for education received by the payor spouse or allowing the payor spouse to attend school during 
le marriage. 
(b) The court may consider the fault of the parties in determining alimony. 
(c) As a general rule, the court should look to the standard of living, existing at the time of 
jparation, in determining alimony in accordance with Subsection (8)(a). However, the court shall 
insider all relevant facts and equitable principles and may, in its discretion, base alimony on the 
andard of living that existed at the time of trial. In marriages of short duration, when no children have 
*en conceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
ie time of the marriage. 
(d) The court may, under appropriate circumstances, attempt to equalize the parties' respective 
andards of living. 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the threshold of a major change in the income of 
ie of the spouses due to the collective efforts of both, that change shall be considered in dividing the 
arital property and in determining the amount of alimony. If one spouse's earning capacity has been 
eatly enhanced through the efforts of both spouses during the marriage, the court may make a 
>mpensating adjustment in dividing the marital property and awarding alimony. 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short duration dissolves, and no children have been 
mceived or born during the marriage, the court may consider restoring each party to the condition 
liich existed at the time of the marriage. 
(g) (i) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make substantive changes and new orders regarding 
tmony based on a substantial material change in circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
vorce. 
(ii) The court may not modify alimony or issue a new order for alimony to address needs of the 
^ipient that did not exist at the time the decree was entered, unless the court finds extenuating 
•cumstances that justify that action. 
(iii) In determining alimony, the income of any subsequent spouse of the payor may not be 
nsidered, except as provided in this Subsection (8). 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent spouse's financial ability to share living expenses. 
(B) The court may consider the income of a subsequent spouse if the court finds that the payor's 
proper conduct justifies that consideration. 
uicui \^uuc 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer than the number of years that the marriage 
existed unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the court finds extenuating circumstances 
that justify the payment of alimony for a longer period of time. 
(9) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of the court that a party pay 
alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage or death of that former spouse. 
However, if the remarriage is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume 
if the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his rights are determined. 
(10) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse terminates upon 
establishment by the party paying alimony that the former spouse is cohabitating with another person. 
Amended by Chapter 285, 2010 General Session 
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Attorney for Respondent 
3856 Washington Blvd. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT STATB OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
DEBRA BOYER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE 
NUNC PRO TUNC TO JUNE 1, 2009 
DARREN BOYER, 
Respondent. 
Civil No: 074900511 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Commissioner Daniel W. Garner 
This matter came on for Trial on Apri! 1,2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on April 8 u d 
,4.2008, before ,l,e District Court, the H o n o r * Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah, The 
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having 
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench 
^ ~t,„.-i 9009 the Court now enters its formal 
.on May 15, 2008 and the court's ruling from December 3, 2009, the oou 
Decree: 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE NWC PRO TUNC TO 1UKE 1.2009
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£ £ C v. « * » " * * * C i v i l N K m9m»' AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE NUN , f r | , „ , „ , 
page,ofl0 l l l fUltt l 
VD31271378 
, A P O 0 S 1 1 BOYER.DARREH 
pages: 10 
1. Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah, 
on July 10, 1993, The parties separated for the fust time in September, 2003, at which time the 
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated 
since January 9, 2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13,2007. Three (3) children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit: Kayne Boyer, born July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, bom 
February 2, 1998; and Cormac Boyer, bom August 9, 2001. 
2. Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code 
Annotated, as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the 
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor 
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal 
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent The Court finds that the best interest of the 
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding 
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the 
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan 
attached hereto as Exhibit "A11 and incorporated herein by reference, 
3. Visitation, As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation under a 2:2:5 
parenting time schedule. Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and Thursday with 
Petitioner and then ever)' other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In addition, the 
parties have agreed that every Easter (Easter Break or school break), the children will be with the 
Petitioner and every UEA holiday, the children will be with the Respondent. This parenting time 
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allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs of the children. 
This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and the Respondent 
also facilitates by living geographically close. 
4. Primary Residence, The Petitioner's home is the primary residence for school and 
church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20) 
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate 
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one 
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other 
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that 
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one part)' was 
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent. 
5, ' Needs of fheChildrenPertaininfftoResidency: The Court, having interviewed the 
children during the trial, the Court finds the following: 
A, The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no 
circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have 
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfiilness toward his mother for not 
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding 
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall 
remain together. 
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B. The Court finds thai Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his 
siblings. 
C. The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with 
his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish 
by remaining together. 
6. Mutual Restraint of the Parties, The Court finds that the children are happy and 
well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between 
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before 
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning 
one another and to govern their actions. The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and 
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning 
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the 
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive 
with the parties' minor children. 
7. Petitioner's Income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old arid 
is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum. She earns 
approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the 
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of Respondent's 
income, the Court finds that she can readily secure full-time employment at a rate at least equal to 
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work Mi-time to help support herself 
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time 
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to 
SI,993.00, which is equal to S4O6.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After 
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the 
Petitioner's nci income to be approximately S i ,594.00 per month. The Courts finds that Petitioner 
wi 11 receive child support of $677.00 per month, giving the Petitioner a monthly income of $2,271.00 
per month. 
8» Respondent's Income. The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock 
broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Court finds that Respondent 
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a 
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year. The Court finds that 
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues* incomes by reducing the size of their 
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonCoin, left Smith Barney's employ in 
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr. 
VonCoin have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices. 
Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate 
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has 
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without 
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that 
Respondent's income tax returns are not reiiabfe because the supporting documents to his accountant 
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends that he has a net income of 
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000,00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The 
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties* 
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive. 
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his 
business of $55,068.00 on his Form 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and $37,708.00 in 2006. These 
amounts already include a deduction for every operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS. 
The Court finds, however, that Respondent was very aggressive in taking large depreciation 
deductions in both years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may 
.legitimately claim these deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his 
business which the Court believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support 
because the cash savings from these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's 
authorized nondeductibles, such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584.00 in 2005, and 
$10,621.00 in 2006, and that is based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court 
finds that the Respondent actually had a net discretionary cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not 
$5,568.00, DeductingRespondent'sincome from LPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges 
and other loans enumerated in Exhibit "43", the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct 
deposits from his business to his personal account of $58,534.00 in 2005 and $58,222.00 in 2006. 
Thus, the evidence preponderates an income of $96,524.00 in 2005, and $ 122,563.00 in 2006. Using 
the same analysis for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was $97,867.00 in 
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2007. However, even Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in 
2007. Considering alt of this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow 
for his business for the purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately 
$110,000.00 per year. I also believe that he has the potential to increase his income once the divorce 
is behind him. The Court finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of 
approximately £6,600.00 per month, or S79,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that 
Respondent's claim of financial difficulty was the result of extravagant living. 
9. Petitioner's Budget and Expenses, The Petitioner estimates that her reasonable 
monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card debt of 
approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses 
for herself and the children is approximately 54,967.00 per month. Combiner her net income of 
$1,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's income is 
$2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month, 
10. Respondent's Budget and Expenses. Respondent estimates his reasonable 
expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes all marital 
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's 
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month. 
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly 
expenses of $6,439,00 per month and leaves him with $217.00 per month, 
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11. Alimony. To equalize the parties' standard of living, the Court orders the Respondent 
to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing 
on July i, 2008. Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to SI,000,00 per month on July 1, 2013, for 
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800,00 per month until December 3!, 
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the 
remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
12. Chiid-Supnort The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $ 1,993.00. 
Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the 
children, Petitioner's responsibility for the children is eighteen percent'(18%). Respondent's 
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support 
worksheet Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the 
/ 
"children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that caJcuJation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00, 
beginning July 1, 2008. The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the 
parties' minor children. Each part)', however, shall pay one-half (54) of those premium costs and one-
half QA) of all uninsured medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children. 
13* Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a 
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court 
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity 
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business 
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00. The Court orders that all of the property 
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from his business, including the building which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to 
Respondent. 
14, Marital Debts. The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support 
their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card 
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay 
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the 
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her 
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including 
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume ail debt that he incurred since the date of the 
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of 
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure. 
15. Personal Property. The Court awards each party his or her retirement accounts. 
Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately 512,500.00. Petitioner's retirement 
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement 
with respect to personal property. 
16. Tax Deductions. In. even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be 
allowed to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax 
purposes for state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of 
household one (1) minor child as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal 
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taxation. In odd years beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head 
of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal 
taxation and that the Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (1) minor child 
as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation as long as there are three 
(3) children to claim, When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions 
for income tax purposes, each part)7 shall claim one(l} child each year. When there in only one (1) 
child to claim as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claimmg that 
child ever>' other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as 
and for income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st 
of each year he wishes to claim the children. 
DATED this ^ 7 day of January, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
AA X DISTRICT COURT JUD 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
WEBER COUNTY, OGDEN DEPARTMENT 
DEBRA BOYER, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DARREN BO YER, 
Respondent. 
AMENDED FINDENGS OF FACT AND 
! CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO 
TUNC TO JUNE 1,2009 
Civil No: 074900511 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
Commissioner Daniel W. Gamer 
This matter came on for Trial on April 1, 2 and 4, 2008, and oral argument on. April 8 and 
-14,2008, before the District Court, the Honorable Michael D. Lyon, District Judge presiding. The 
Petitioner was present and represented by her attorney, Joseph M. Chambers, Logan, Utah. The 
Respondent was present and represented by his attorney, John Cummings, Ogden, Utah. Having 
considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and having rendered its decision from the bench 
on May 15, 2008 arid the courts ruling from December 3, 2009, the Court now enters its formal 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
It Date of Marriage and Other Dates. The parties were married in Hennifer, Utah, 
on July 10, 1993. The parties separated for the first time in September, 2003, at which time the 
Defendant moved back into the home in February or March, 2004. The parties have been separated 
since January 9, 2007, and Petitioner filed for divorce on March 13, 2007. Three (3) children have 
been born as issue of this marriage, to wit; Kayne Boyer, bora July 29, 1995; Talon Boyer, bom 
February' 2, 1998; and Cormac Boyer, born August 9, 2001. 
2. Custody. The Court has delineated in case law specifically Rule 4.903, Utah Code 
Annotated, as well as statutory provisions of Title 30, and weighed in the best interest of the 
children. The Court awards the parties joint physical custody and legal custody of the parties' minor 
children. The Court agrees with Dr. Davies, who observed that giving one parent sole joint or legal 
custody would unnecessarily restrict the other parent. The Court finds that the best interest of the 
children will be best served as much as possible with the parties making joint decisions regarding 
health, education and general welfare. Further, the Court finds that if the Petitioner moves from the 
community, the Court would consider changing the custody arrangement. See Parenting Plan 
attached hereto as Exhibit "AH and incorporated herein by reference. 
3. Visitation. As described by Dr. Davies, the parties shall have visitation under a 2:2:5 
parenting time schedule. For example: Monday and Tuesday with Respondent, Wednesday and 
Thursday with Petitioner and then ever)' other Friday, Saturday and Sunday the parties alternate. In 
addition, the parties have agreed that ever)' Easter (Easter break or school break) the children will 
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be with the Petitioner and every UEA holiday the children will be with the Respondent, This 
parenting time allows stability with both parents, friends and is dynamic and sensitive to the needs 
of the children. This arrangement remains in place as long as the Petitioner remains in the area and 
the Respondent also facilitates by living geographically close, 
4. Primary Residence. The Petitioner's home is the primary7 residence for school and 
church purpose. This residency will remain in effect as long as the parties stay within a twenty (20) 
mile radius with each other. It is my expectation that Respondent will remain in the area to facilitate 
this arrangement as per the assurances he made in Court. In the event that there is an impasse on one 
of the key decisions that needs to be made, the Court appoints Dr. Dallas Empey, or such other 
qualified person, to act as a parent-time coordinator, and the parties will equally pay initially that 
expense and then, if necessary, bring the issue back to Court. If the Court feels that one party was 
unreasonable, the Court reserves the right at that time to assess those expenses to the other parent. 
5. Needs of the Children Pertaining to Residency: The Court, having interviewed the 
children during the trial, the Court finds the following: 
A. The Court finds that Kayne wants to live with his father and, under no 
circumstances does he want to move to Oklahoma. Kayne is very close to his father and they have 
similar interest and activities. Kayne has expressed some resentfulness toward his mother for not 
allowing him to live with his father, and this concerns the Court. After some thought regarding 
separating the children and having Kayne live with his father, the Court orders that the siblings shall 
remain together. 
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B. The Court finds that Talon is a buffer between both his parents and his 
siblings. 
C The Court finds that Cormac is bonded to both parents and wants to be with 
his siblings. Cormac is dependent on his brothers for emotional support and all siblings will flourish 
by remaining together. 
6. Mutual Restraint of the Parties. The Court finds that the children are happy and 
well-adjusted with their custody arrangement, but these children are aware of the conflicts between 
their parents. The Court strong suggests that the parties stop the fighting between themselves before 
their arguing adversely affects their children. The Court orders the parties to desist in demeaning 
one another and to govern their actions, The Court finds that both parents are emotionally stable and 
can provide stability for their children. The Petitioner was the primary care giver in the beginning 
but as the children grew older, the parties shared equally in that responsibility. In terms of the 
kinship between step-parent, the Court finds the relationship with Mrs. Jessica Jacques to be positive 
with the parties' minor children, 
7. Petitioner's income. The Court finds the Petitioner is thirty-eight (38) years old and 
is employed as a bookkeeper for her father-in-law at Western State Petroleum. She earns 
approximately $11.50 per hour and works approximately twenty (20) hours per week. Based on the 
prodigious work that she did in pulling together the financial records for the analysis of Respondent's 
income the Court finds that she can readily secuve full-time employment at a rate at least eotual to 
her current wage. The Court also finds that Petitioner needs to work full-time to help support herself 
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and the Court advises her of this. Accordingly, the Court deems appropriate to impute full-time 
salary to Petitioner at her current hourly wage. The Court, therefore, imputes Petitioner's salary to 
$1,993.00, which is equal to $406.00 per week multiplied by 4.333 weeks per month. After 
deducting legal and mandatory deductions of approximately $399.00, the Court estimates the 
Petitioner's net income to be approximately $1,594,00 per month, The Courts finds that Petitioner 
will receive child support of $677.00 per month, giving the Petitioner a monthly income of $2,271.00 
per month. 
8. Respondent's Income, The Court finds that the Respondent is employed as a stock 
broker and financial advisor for Lindsco Private Provider ("LPL"). The Court finds that Respondent 
does not sale outside of his employment and that Respondent was employed by Smith Barney as a 
stock broker from 1994-2003 earning approximately $160,000.00 per year, The Court finds that 
Smith Barney reduced Petitioner's and other colleagues1 incomes by reducing the size of their 
commissions. In so doing, Respondent and colleague, Jeff VonColn, left Smith Barney's employ in 
2003 and secured employment with LPL, sharing office expenses. Since 2003, Respondent and Mr. 
VonColn have moved several times, each time improving the size and amenities of their offices. 
'Ascertaining Respondent's income has been difficult because he has not maintained adequate 
accounting records that would normally be found in a business. Respondent's accountant has 
prepared tax filings each year and did so from summaries provided by the Respondent without 
adequate and normal ledger support, by reconciliation with bank statements. The Court finds that 
Respondent's income tax returns are not rel iable because the supporting documents to his accountant 
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were not reliable. The Court finds that the Respondent contends chat he has a net income of 
approximately $48,000.00 to $63,000.00 per year. The Court disagrees with that amount. The 
evidence of his net income is not only inconsistent with the evidence presented by the parties' 
standard of living, but the Court found the testimony of Clifford Grover particularly persuasive. 
Using Exhibit P43 for its analysis, the Court finds that the Respondent's recorded net income of his 
business of 555,068.00 on his for 1120S to the IRS in 2005 and 537,708.00 in 2006. These amounts 
already include a deduction for ever)' operating expense Respondent claimed to the IRS. The Court 
finds, however, that Respondent was very' aggressive in taking large depreciation deductions in both 
years and as Section 179 write-off in the first year of 2006. While he may legitimately claim these 
deductions with the IRS, they significantly reduce his cash-flow from his business which the Court 
believes it should consider in calculating alimony and child support because the cash savings from 
these deductions flows into his pocket. After deducting Respondent's authorized nondeductibles, 
such as authorized portions of his meals ($6,584,00 in 2005, and $10,621.00 in 2006, and that is 
based on the information provided to his own accountant), the Court finds that the Respondent 
actually had a net discretionary' cash flow of $43,558.00 in 2005, not $5,568,00. Deducting 
Respondent's income from LPL, treasury refunds, lines of credit, Visa charges and other loans 
enumerated in Exhibit n43'\ the Court finds that Respondent had additional direct deposits from his 
business to his personal account of $58,534,00 in 2005 and $58,222,00 in 2006. Thus, the evidence 
preponderates an income of $96,524,00 in 2005, and $122,563.00 in 2006. Using the same analysis 
for 2007, Mr. Grover also opined that Respondent's income was S97..867.00 in 2007. However, even 
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Respondent admits that distractions of the divorce reduced his income in 2007. Considering all of 
this evidence, the Court finds that Respondent's discretionary cash-flow for his business for the 
purpose of establishing alimony and child-support, is approximately $110,000.00 per year. [ also 
believe that he has the'potential to increase his income once the divorce is behind him. The Court 
finds that after anticipated taxes, the Respondent has a net income of approximately $6,600.00 per 
month or 279,200.00 per year. In passing, the Court observes that Respondent's claim of financial 
difficult)' was the result of extravagant living. 
9. Petitioner's Budget and Expenses. The Court estimates that the Petitioner has 
reasonable monthly expenses, including the debt to her father and her post-separation credit-card 
debt of approximately $6,067.00 per month. The Court finds that Petitioner's reasonable monthly 
expenses for herself and the children is approximately $4,967.00 per month. Combiner her net 
income of SJ ,594.00 and child support from Respondent of $677.00 per month, the Petitioner's 
income is $2,271.00 per month, which leaves Petitioner a $2,696.00 short-fall each month, 
10. Respondent's Budget and Expenses. Respondent estimates his reasonable 
expenses, excluding alimony and child support, to be $8,300.00. This amount includes ail marital 
debt to Petitioner's father and post-separation credit-card debt. The Court finds that Respondent's 
reasonable monthly expenses for himself and the children is approximately $5,762.00 per month. 
Adding the child-support obligation of $677.00 per month, the Respondent has reasonable monthly 
expenses of $6,439.00 per month and leaves him with a $217.00 per month short-fall. 
11. Alimony. To equalize the parties1 standard of li ving, the Court orders the Respondent 
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to pay the Petitioner $1,428.00 in alimony each month for a period of five (5) years, commencing 
on July 1, 2008, Thereafter, the alimony is reduced to $1,000.00 per month on July 1, 2013, for 
another five (5) years and then the alimony is reduced to $800.00 per month until December 31, 
2015, at which time the alimony shall terminate. In any event, the alimony will terminate at the 
remarriage or death of the Petitioner. 
12, Child-Support. The Court finds that Petitioner's gross monthly income is $ 1,993,00. 
Respondent's gross monthly income is $9,167.00. The combined support is $2,056.00 for the 
children. Petitioner's responsibility for the children is eighteen percent (18%). Respondent's 
responsibility for the children is eighty-two percent (82%). For purpose of the child support 
worksheet, Petitioner will have the children 183 nights per year, while the Respondent will have the 
children 182 nights per year. The Court finds that calculation to be $676.84, rounded up to $677.00. 
The Respondent shall also maintain health insurance for the benefit of the parties' minor children. 
Each party, however, shall pay one-half (l/2) of those premium costs and one-half (Vi) of all uninsured 
medical expenses for the benefit of the minor children. 
13. Property. The Court finds that the Respondent acquired a partnership interest in a 
commercial building on 25th Street in Ogden, Utah, where he conducts his business. The Court 
finds that there was evidence presented at trial that his business volume included the building equity 
of $32,000.00 that he valued his business at $349,400.00. The Court finds that there were business 
liabilities of $329,100.00 leaving a net value of $20,300.00, The Court orders that ail of the property 
from his business including the building, which the Court finds to be $20,300.00, be awarded to 
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Respondent, 
14. Marital Debts, The parties have incurred a great deal of consumer debt to support 
their extravagant lifestyle. The Court finds that the parties owed nearly $79,000.00 in credit-card 
debt at the time of their separation and is now much more than that. The Respondent agrees to pay 
off the debt which will impact him negatively if he were to file bankruptcy. It could cost the 
Respondent his license. The Court honors his request and orders him to pay all of the marital debt 
that existed at the time of the parties' separation. The Petitioner will assume all of the debt to her 
father and all post-separation debt incurred without Respondent's knowledge or approval, including 
her credit-card debt. Respondent will assume all debt that he incurred since the.date of the 
separation. The Court is mindful that this is settling the Respondent with a substantial amount of 
debt, but has already factored that debt in large measure into the alimony structure. 
15, Personal Property. The Court awards each part)' his or her retirement accounts. 
Respondent's retirement account is valued at approximately $12,500.00, Petitioner's retirement 
account is valued at approximately $2,500.00. The Court adopts the rest of the parties' agreement 
with respect to personal property. 
16/Tax Deduction. In even years beginning in tax year 2008, the Defendant shall be allowed 
to claim as head of household two (2) minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for 
state and federal taxation and the Petitioner shall be allowed to claim ss head of household one (1) 
mmor child as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation. In odd years 
beginning with the tax year 2009, Petitioner shall be allowed to claim as head of household two (2) 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NUNC FRO TUNC TO JUNE 1, 2009 
Dcbra Boyer v. Darren Boyer; Civil No: 07490051 i 
Page 9 of II 
minor children as tax exemptions for income tax purposes for state and federal taxation and that the 
Respondent shall be allowed to claim as head of household one (I) minor child as tax exemptions 
for income tax purposes for state and federal tavXation as long as there are three (3) children to claim. 
When there are only two (2) children eligible to be claimed as tax exemptions for income tax 
purposes, each part)' shall claim one (1) child each year. When there in only one (1) child to claim 
as head of household and as a tax exemption, the parties shall alternate claiming that child every 
other year. However, in order for the Respondent to be eligible to claim any children as and for 
income tax exemptions, he must be current in his child-support obligation on December 31 st of each 
year he wishes to claim the children. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1, The parties shall be awarded a Decree of Divorce as set out in the Findings of Fact 
above.
 f • J 
DATED this pffiday of Janiary,@WO. 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTWcfcbURf JUDGE 
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NOTICE TO RESPONDENT 
TO: RESPONDENT 
Pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure §7(f)(2), the proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LA WwiU be filed with the above-entitled Court five (5) days after service upon 
you to the Honorable District Court Judge for her/his signature. Your Objection, if any, must be 
filed with the Court within five (5) days after service. Kindly govern yourself accordingly. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I faxed and mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW NUNC PRO TUNC JUNE J, 2009 postage 
prepaid this fflrrflay of January', 2010, to the following: 
Debra Beyer 
1374 W. 1100N. 
°
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SE6&STARY T7y 
AMENDED FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
NUNC PRO TUNC TO JUNE J, 2009 
D?b;a Boyer v. Darren Boyer, Civil No: 07490051 i 
Page l i o r i l 
Kristopher K. Greenwood (8581) 
Rand Lunceford (11710) 
KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
195 Historic 25th Street, Suite 304 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801)475-8800 
Facsimile: (801) 475-9800 
c. i 
• i' o v/» * ~/ 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY, 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DEBRA BOYER, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
DARREN BOYER, 
Respondent and Appelle. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Case No. 07490051 IDA 
Judge: Michael D. Lyon 
Comm.: Daniel Gamer 
0 4 / 2 3 / 1 
Notice is hereby given that Petitioner, DEBRA BOYER, appeals to the Utah Court of 
Appeals the final order of the Honorable Michael D. Lyon entered in this matter on March 25,2010. 
The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
DATED this ^ 3 day of U^l^t 2010. 
KRISTOPHER K. GREENWOOD, LC 
Rand G. Lunceford 
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that on this 7^P day of n D h 1 , 2010,1 delivered a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing Notice of Appeal to the following: 
©Via Mail (Postage Pre-paid) DYia Fax QVia Hand Delivery 
John Cummings 
Attorney for Darren Boyer 
3856Washington Blvd. 
Ogden, Utah 84403 
cc: client 
? 
